@book{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Essays in Empirical Political Economics},
  pages     = {XI, 174 S. : Ill., graph. Darst.},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms},
  series = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {1612-0663},
  pages     = {47 -- 52},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament},
  series = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  volume    = {36},
  journal   = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0176-2680},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001},
  pages     = {55 -- 70},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{Behbahani2014,
  author    = {Behbahani, Mehdi},
  title     = {An Experimental Study of Thrombocyte Reactions in Response to Biomaterial Surfaces and Varying Shear Stress},
  series = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Systems Prague, Czech Republic, August 14-15, 2014},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Systems Prague, Czech Republic, August 14-15, 2014},
  pages     = {Paper 125},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Tran2014,
  author    = {Tran, Duc Hung},
  title     = {Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital - Evidence from Germany},
  series = {The British Accounting Review},
  volume    = {46},
  journal   = {The British Accounting Review},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0890-8389},
  doi       = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.02.003},
  pages     = {179 -- 197},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Olbertz2014,
  author    = {Olbertz, Klaus},
  title     = {Gestaltung des Anstellungsvertrags - Der Compliance-Beauftragte},
  series = {Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht : AuA},
  journal   = {Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht : AuA},
  number    = {7},
  publisher = {Huss Medien},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0323-4568},
  pages     = {400 -- 403},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Ein Compliance-Beauftragter soll daf{\"u}r Sorge tragen, dass aus dem Unternehmen heraus keine Rechtsverletzungen begangen werden. Aber welche rechtlichen Notwendigkeiten und M{\"o}glichkeiten resultieren daraus f{\"u}r die Gestaltung des Anstellungsvertrags?},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Olbertz2014,
  author    = {Olbertz, Klaus},
  title     = {Arbeitnehmereigenschaft des mitarbeitenden Gesellschafters einer GmbH},
  series = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  journal   = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  issn      = {1868-1816},
  pages     = {532 -- 532},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Olbertz2014,
  author    = {Olbertz, Klaus},
  title     = {Kein Anspruch auf Tarifgehaltserh{\"o}hungen bei K{\"u}ndigung des in Bezug genommenen Anerkennungstarifvertrags},
  series = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  journal   = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  issn      = {1868-1816},
  pages     = {377 -- 377},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Olbertz2014,
  author    = {Olbertz, Klaus},
  title     = {Vorbesch{\"a}ftigungszeiten als Leiharbeitnehmer z{\"a}hlen f{\"u}r K{\"u}ndigungsschutz grunds{\"a}tzlich nicht mit},
  series = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  journal   = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  issn      = {1868-1816},
  pages     = {423 -- 423},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Olbertz2014,
  author    = {Olbertz, Klaus},
  title     = {Arbeitszeitbetrug rechtfertigt fristlose K{\"u}ndigung auch bei langer Betriebszugeh{\"o}rigkeit},
  series = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  journal   = {Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht : GWR},
  issn      = {1868-1816},
  pages     = {465 -- 465},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {de}
}