@misc{KrollLudwigs2013, author = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin}, title = {Internationales Privatrecht - ein systematischer {\"U}berblick}, series = {Rabels Zeitschrift f{\"u}r ausl{\"a}ndisches und internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ)}, volume = {77}, journal = {Rabels Zeitschrift f{\"u}r ausl{\"a}ndisches und internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ)}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1628/003372513X671354}, pages = {843 -- 849}, year = {2013}, language = {de} } @book{Bernecker2014, author = {Bernecker, Andreas}, title = {Essays in Empirical Political Economics}, pages = {XI, 174 S. : Ill., graph. Darst.}, year = {2014}, language = {en} } @article{Bernecker2014, author = {Bernecker, Andreas}, title = {Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms}, series = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison}, volume = {12}, journal = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison}, number = {4}, publisher = {Ifo Institute for Economic Research}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, issn = {1612-0663}, pages = {47 -- 52}, year = {2014}, language = {en} } @article{Bernecker2014, author = {Bernecker, Andreas}, title = {Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {36}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001}, pages = {55 -- 70}, year = {2014}, abstract = {Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.}, language = {en} } @article{Bernecker2016, author = {Bernecker, Andreas}, title = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {142}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0047-2727}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003}, pages = {24 -- 38}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BerneckerBoyerGathmann2018, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bernecker, Andreas and Boyer, Pierre and Gathmann, Christina}, title = {The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform}, series = {CESifo Working Paper}, journal = {CESifo Working Paper}, number = {No. 6964}, organization = {CESifo Group Munich}, issn = {ISSN 2364-1428 (electronic version)}, pages = {60}, year = {2018}, language = {en} } @article{BerneckerKlierSternetal.2018, author = {Bernecker, Andreas and Klier, Julia and Stern, Sebastian and Thiel, Lea}, title = {Sustaining high performance beyond public-sector pilot projects.}, number = {September 2018}, organization = {McKinsey\&Company}, year = {2018}, language = {en} } @book{FockeSteinbeck2018, author = {Focke, Markus and Steinbeck, J{\"o}rn}, title = {Steigerung der Anlagenproduktivit{\"a}t durch OEE-Management : Definitionen, Vorgehen und Methoden - von manuell bis Industrie 4.0}, publisher = {Springer Fachmedien}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-21456-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-21456-2}, year = {2018}, language = {de} } @inproceedings{HammerViethMaier2005, author = {Hammer, Andreas and Vieth, Matthias and Maier, Frank}, title = {Co-Plot as a new multivariate analysis method for operations management research?}, series = {Papers of the 12th International EurOMA Conference on Operational and Global Competitiveness, Budapest, Hungary, June 19-22, 2005 / Editor: Krisztina Demeter}, booktitle = {Papers of the 12th International EurOMA Conference on Operational and Global Competitiveness, Budapest, Hungary, June 19-22, 2005 / Editor: Krisztina Demeter}, isbn = {963-218-455-6}, pages = {1007 -- 1016}, year = {2005}, language = {en} } @incollection{Timme2019, author = {Timme, Michael}, title = {Kommentierung zu \S\S 705 - 740}, series = {Handbuch der Beweislast - Band 2, \S\S 1 - 811 BGB / Baumg{\"a}rtel, Gottfried ; Laumen, Hans-Willi ; Pr{\"u}tting, Hanns (Hrsg.). 4., v{\"o}llig {\"u}berarbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage}, booktitle = {Handbuch der Beweislast - Band 2, \S\S 1 - 811 BGB / Baumg{\"a}rtel, Gottfried ; Laumen, Hans-Willi ; Pr{\"u}tting, Hanns (Hrsg.). 4., v{\"o}llig {\"u}berarbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage}, publisher = {Carl Heymanns}, address = {K{\"o}ln}, isbn = {978-3-452-29003-8}, pages = {1637 -- 1664}, year = {2019}, language = {de} }