@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}