@article{BerneckerKlierSternetal.2018,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas and Klier, Julia and Stern, Sebastian and Thiel, Lea},
  title     = {Sustaining high performance beyond public-sector pilot projects.},
  number    = {September 2018},
  organization    = {McKinsey\&Company},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BerneckerBoyerGathmann2018,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas and Boyer, Pierre and Gathmann, Christina},
  title     = {The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform},
  series = {CESifo Working Paper},
  journal   = {CESifo Working Paper},
  number    = {No. 6964},
  organization    = {CESifo Group Munich},
  issn      = {ISSN 2364-1428 (electronic version)},
  pages     = {60},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament},
  series = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  volume    = {36},
  journal   = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0176-2680},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001},
  pages     = {55 -- 70},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms},
  series = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {1612-0663},
  pages     = {47 -- 52},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Essays in Empirical Political Economics},
  pages     = {XI, 174 S. : Ill., graph. Darst.},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BerneckerBoyerGathmann2021,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas and Boyer, Pierre C. and Gathmann, Christina},
  title     = {The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform},
  series = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume    = {13},
  journal   = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {American Economic Association},
  address   = {Nashville, Tenn.},
  issn      = {1945-774X},
  doi       = {10.1257/pol.20190690},
  pages     = {26 -- 57},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2010,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {A European Private Company: Is Europe's single legal form for SMEs close to approval?},
  series = {Research Briefing},
  journal   = {Research Briefing},
  publisher = {Deutsche Bank Research},
  address   = {Frankfurt a. M.},
  issn      = {2193-5955},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {This Research Briefing, issued in July 2010, concluded that: - Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Europe have long called for a matching legal form valid across the EU (similar to that of the European company (SE) for large firms) - The main benefits would be the availability of uniform Europe-wide company structures, significant cost reductions for businesses and further integration of the internal market - Given the differing national views regarding the concrete features of the new legal form there is currently no sign of an agreement being reached at the European level in the short term; however, it is possible that progress will be made in negotiations during the year - The key issues being discussed in depth are company formation, transnationality and employee participation rights in the new European private company (SPE).},
  language  = {en}
}