@techreport{BerneckerBoyerGathmann2018,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas and Boyer, Pierre and Gathmann, Christina},
  title     = {The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform},
  series = {CESifo Working Paper},
  journal   = {CESifo Working Paper},
  number    = {No. 6964},
  organization    = {CESifo Group Munich},
  issn      = {ISSN 2364-1428 (electronic version)},
  pages     = {60},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchneiderTran2015,
  author    = {Schneider, Felix and Tran, Duc Hung},
  title     = {On the relation between the fair value option and bid-ask spreads: descriptive evidence on the recognition of credit risk changes under IFRS},
  series = {Journal of Business Economics},
  volume    = {85},
  journal   = {Journal of Business Economics},
  number    = {9},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {1861-8928},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11573-015-0776-2},
  pages     = {1049 -- 1081},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Tran2014,
  author    = {Tran, Duc Hung},
  title     = {Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital - Evidence from Germany},
  series = {The British Accounting Review},
  volume    = {46},
  journal   = {The British Accounting Review},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0890-8389},
  doi       = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.02.003},
  pages     = {179 -- 197},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{DethloffKrollLudwigs2006,
  author    = {Dethloff, Nina and Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {The Constitutional Court as Driver of Reforms in German Family Law},
  series = {International Survey of Family Law},
  journal   = {International Survey of Family Law},
  pages     = {217 -- 234},
  year      = {2006},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{DethloffKrollLudwigs2008,
  author    = {Dethloff, Nina and Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Strengthening Children's Rights in German Family Law},
  series = {The International Survey of Family Law},
  journal   = {The International Survey of Family Law},
  pages     = {119 -- 136},
  year      = {2008},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KrollLudwigs2007,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {The Reform of German Maintenance Law},
  series = {The International Survey of Family Law},
  journal   = {The International Survey of Family Law},
  pages     = {85 -- 100},
  year      = {2007},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2008,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Unification of Conflict of Laws in Europe. Matrimonial Property Regimes},
  series = {European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law},
  booktitle = {European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law},
  editor    = {Boele-Woelki, Katharina},
  publisher = {Intersentia},
  address   = {Antwerpen},
  isbn      = {978-90-5095-692-5},
  pages     = {379 -- 393},
  year      = {2008},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{HammerViethMaier2005,
  author    = {Hammer, Andreas and Vieth, Matthias and Maier, Frank},
  title     = {Co-Plot as a new multivariate analysis method for operations management research?},
  series = {Papers of the 12th International EurOMA Conference on Operational and Global Competitiveness, Budapest, Hungary, June 19-22, 2005 / Editor: Krisztina Demeter},
  booktitle = {Papers of the 12th International EurOMA Conference on Operational and Global Competitiveness, Budapest, Hungary, June 19-22, 2005 / Editor: Krisztina Demeter},
  isbn      = {963-218-455-6},
  pages     = {1007 -- 1016},
  year      = {2005},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{ViethHammerMaier2005,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Vieth, Matthias and Hammer, A. and Maier, F.},
  title     = {A critical analysis of the co-plot method},
  series = {International University in Germany, School of Business Administration / Working paper},
  journal   = {International University in Germany, School of Business Administration / Working paper},
  number    = {32},
  publisher = {School of Business Administration, Intern. Univ. in Germany},
  address   = {Bruchsal},
  pages     = {22 Bl{\"a}tter},
  year      = {2005},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}