@incollection{KrollLudwigs2017,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Small Claims Regulation},
  series = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  booktitle = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
  address   = {Cheltenham, UK},
  isbn      = {9781782547228},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 5 Rom III-Regulation (choice of applicable law by the parties)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Calliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 7 Rome III-Regulation (formal validity)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Colliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament},
  series = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  volume    = {36},
  journal   = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0176-2680},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001},
  pages     = {55 -- 70},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms},
  series = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {1612-0663},
  pages     = {47 -- 52},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Essays in Empirical Political Economics},
  pages     = {XI, 174 S. : Ill., graph. Darst.},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Pietsch2015,
  author    = {Pietsch, Wolfram},
  title     = {Augmenting voice of the customer analysis by analysis of belief},
  series = {QFD-Forum},
  journal   = {QFD-Forum},
  number    = {30},
  issn      = {1431-6951},
  pages     = {1 -- 5},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{EmhardtJarodzkaBrandGruweletal.2020,
  author    = {Emhardt, Selina and Jarodzka, Halszka and Brand-Gruwel, Saskia and Drumm, Christian and Gog, Tamara van},
  title     = {Introducing eye movement modeling examples for programming education and the role of teacher's didactic guidance},
  series = {ETRA '20 Short Papers: ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research and Applications},
  journal   = {ETRA '20 Short Papers: ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research and Applications},
  number    = {Art. 52},
  publisher = {ACM},
  address   = {New York},
  doi       = {10.1145/3379156.3391978},
  pages     = {1 -- 4},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {In this article, we introduce how eye-tracking technology might become a promising tool to teach programming skills, such as debugging with 'Eye Movement Modeling Examples' (EMME). EMME are tutorial videos that visualize an expert's (e.g., a programming teacher's) eye movements during task performance to guide students' attention, e.g., as a moving dot or circle. We first introduce the general idea behind the EMME method and present studies that showed first promising results regarding the benefits of EMME to support programming education. However, we argue that the instructional design of EMME varies notably across them, as evidence-based guidelines on how to create effective EMME are often lacking. As an example, we present our ongoing research on the effects of different ways to instruct the EMME model prior to video creation. Finally, we highlight open questions for future investigations that could help improving the design of EMME for (programming) education.},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Gell2012,
  author    = {Gell, Sebastian},
  title     = {Determinants of earnings forecast error, earnings forecast revision and earnings forecast accuracy},
  publisher = {Springer Gabler},
  address   = {Wiesbaden},
  isbn      = {978-3-8349-3936-4},
  doi       = {10.1007/978-3-8349-3937-1},
  pages     = {XXIV, 125 Seiten},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {​Earnings forecasts are ubiquitous in today's financial markets. They are essential indicators of future firm performance and a starting point for firm valuation. Extremely inaccurate and overoptimistic forecasts during the most recent financial crisis have raised serious doubts regarding the reliability of such forecasts. This thesis therefore investigates new determinants of forecast errors and accuracy. In addition, new determinants of forecast revisions are examined. More specifically, the thesis answers the following questions: 1) How do analyst incentives lead to forecast errors? 2) How do changes in analyst incentives lead to forecast revisions?, and 3) What factors drive differences in forecast accuracy?},
  language  = {en}
}