@inproceedings{WiesenEngemannLimpertetal.2018,
  author    = {Wiesen, Patrick and Engemann, Heiko and Limpert, Nicolas and Kallweit, Stephan},
  title     = {Learning by Doing - Mobile Robotics in the FH Aachen ROS Summer School},
  series = {European Robotics Forum 2018, TRROS18 Workshop},
  booktitle = {European Robotics Forum 2018, TRROS18 Workshop},
  pages     = {47 -- 58},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Moosdorf2009,
  author    = {Moosdorf, Andreas},
  title     = {It's not just the Talent, it's the Knowledge Transfer Method},
  series = {GC Ticker},
  journal   = {GC Ticker},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {16 -- 16},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Moosdorf2008,
  author    = {Moosdorf, Andreas},
  title     = {The determinants of international knowledge transfer effectiveness - conceptual advances and empirical verification},
  year      = {2008},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2017,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Names of individuals},
  series = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  booktitle = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
  address   = {Cheltenham, UK},
  isbn      = {9781782547228},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2017,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Small Claims Regulation},
  series = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  booktitle = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
  address   = {Cheltenham, UK},
  isbn      = {9781782547228},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 5 Rom III-Regulation (choice of applicable law by the parties)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Calliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{CalliessKrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Calliess, Gralf-Peter and Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 6 Rome III-Regulation (consent and material validity)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 7 Rome III-Regulation (formal validity)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Colliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{SerrorHenzeHacketal.2018,
  author    = {Serror, Martin and Henze, Martin and Hack, Sacha and Schuba, Marko and Wehrle, Klaus},
  title     = {Towards in-network security for smart homes},
  series = {13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2018; Hamburg; Germany; 27 August 2018 through 30 August 2018},
  booktitle = {13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2018; Hamburg; Germany; 27 August 2018 through 30 August 2018},
  isbn      = {978-145036448-5},
  doi       = {10.1145/3230833.3232802},
  pages     = {Article numer 3232802},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}