@article{GoergensGreubelMoosdorf2013,
  author    = {G{\"o}rgens, Stefan and Greubel, Steffen and Moosdorf, Andreas},
  title     = {How to mobilize 20,000 people: Perspectives on retail and consumer goods},
  pages     = {52 -- 58},
  year      = {2013},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Moosdorf2009,
  author    = {Moosdorf, Andreas},
  title     = {It's not just the Talent, it's the Knowledge Transfer Method},
  series = {GC Ticker},
  journal   = {GC Ticker},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {16 -- 16},
  year      = {2009},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Moosdorf2008,
  author    = {Moosdorf, Andreas},
  title     = {The determinants of international knowledge transfer effectiveness - conceptual advances and empirical verification},
  year      = {2008},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2017,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Names of individuals},
  series = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  booktitle = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
  address   = {Cheltenham, UK},
  isbn      = {9781782547228},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2017,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Small Claims Regulation},
  series = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  booktitle = {European Encyclopedia of Private International Law},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
  address   = {Cheltenham, UK},
  isbn      = {9781782547228},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 5 Rom III-Regulation (choice of applicable law by the parties)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Calliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{KrollLudwigs2015,
  author    = {Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin},
  title     = {Art. 7 Rome III-Regulation (formal validity)},
  series = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  booktitle = {Rome Regulations : commentary},
  editor    = {Colliess, Gralf-Peter},
  edition   = {2nd ed.},
  publisher = {Wolters Kluwer},
  isbn      = {9789041147547},
  year      = {2015},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2016,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies},
  series = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume    = {142},
  journal   = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0047-2727},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003},
  pages     = {24 -- 38},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25\% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament},
  series = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  volume    = {36},
  journal   = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0176-2680},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001},
  pages     = {55 -- 70},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bernecker2014,
  author    = {Bernecker, Andreas},
  title     = {Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms},
  series = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Ifo Institute for Economic Research},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {1612-0663},
  pages     = {47 -- 52},
  year      = {2014},
  language  = {en}
}