TY - CHAP A1 - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin ED - Calliess, Gralf-Peter T1 - Art. 5 Rom III-Regulation (choice of applicable law by the parties) T2 - Rome Regulations : commentary Y1 - 2015 SN - 9789041147547 PB - Wolters Kluwer ET - 2nd ed. ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin ED - Colliess, Gralf-Peter T1 - Art. 7 Rome III-Regulation (formal validity) T2 - Rome Regulations : commentary Y1 - 2015 SN - 9789041147547 PB - Wolters Kluwer ET - 2nd ed. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Klettke, Tanja A1 - Homburg, Carsten A1 - Gell, Sebastian T1 - How to measure analyst forecast effort JF - European Accounting Review N2 - We introduce a new way to measure the forecast effort that analysts devote to their earnings forecasts by measuring the analyst's general effort for all covered firms. While the commonly applied effort measure is based on analyst behaviour for one firm, our measure considers analyst behaviour for all covered firms. Our general effort measure captures additional information about analyst effort and thus can identify accurate forecasts. We emphasise the importance of investigating analyst behaviour in a larger context and argue that analysts who generally devote substantial forecast effort are also likely to devote substantial effort to a specific firm, even if this effort might not be captured by a firm-specific measure. Empirical results reveal that analysts who devote higher general forecast effort issue more accurate forecasts. Additional investigations show that analysts' career prospects improve with higher general forecast effort. Our measure improves on existing methods as it has higher explanatory power regarding differences in forecast accuracy than the commonly applied effort measure. Additionally, it can address research questions that cannot be examined with a firm-specific measure. It provides a simple but comprehensive way to identify accurate analysts. Y1 - 2015 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2014.909291 SN - 0963-8180 VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 129 EP - 146 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pietsch, Wolfram T1 - Augmenting voice of the customer analysis by analysis of belief JF - QFD-Forum Y1 - 2015 SN - 1431-6951 IS - 30 SP - 1 EP - 5 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Becker, Jörg A1 - Delfmann, Patrick A1 - Dietrich, Hanns-Alexander A1 - Steinhorst, Matthias A1 - Eggert, Mathias T1 - Business Process Compliance Checking — Applying and Evaluating a Generic Pattern Matching Approach for Conceptual Models in the Financial Sector JF - Information Systems Frontiers N2 - Given the strong increase in regulatory requirements for business processes the management of business process compliance becomes a more and more regarded field in IS research. Several methods have been developed to support compliance checking of conceptual models. However, their focus on distinct modeling languages and mostly linear (i.e., predecessor-successor related) compliance rules may hinder widespread adoption and application in practice. Furthermore, hardly any of them has been evaluated in a real-world setting. We address this issue by applying a generic pattern matching approach for conceptual models to business process compliance checking in the financial sector. It consists of a model query language, a search algorithm and a corresponding modelling tool prototype. It is (1) applicable for all graph-based conceptual modeling languages and (2) for different kinds of compliance rules. Furthermore, based on an applicability check, we (3) evaluate the approach in a financial industry project setting against its relevance for decision support of audit and compliance management tasks. Y1 - 2016 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10796-014-9529-y SN - 1572-9419 VL - 18 IS - 2 SP - 359 EP - 405 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies JF - Journal of Public Economics N2 - Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house. Y1 - 2016 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 SN - 0047-2727 VL - 142 SP - 24 EP - 38 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin T1 - Names of individuals T2 - European Encyclopedia of Private International Law Y1 - 2017 SN - 9781782547228 PB - Edward Elgar Publishing CY - Cheltenham, UK ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin T1 - Small Claims Regulation T2 - European Encyclopedia of Private International Law Y1 - 2017 SN - 9781782547228 PB - Edward Elgar Publishing CY - Cheltenham, UK ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas A1 - Klier, Julia A1 - Stern, Sebastian A1 - Thiel, Lea T1 - Sustaining high performance beyond public-sector pilot projects. Y1 - 2018 IS - September 2018 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bernecker, Andreas A1 - Boyer, Pierre A1 - Gathmann, Christina T1 - The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform T2 - CESifo Working Paper Y1 - 2018 SN - ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version) IS - No. 6964 ER -