TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - A European Private Company: Is Europe’s single legal form for SMEs close to approval? JF - Research Briefing Y1 - 2010 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas A1 - Boyer, Pierre C. A1 - Gathmann, Christina T1 - The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20190690 SN - 1945-774X VL - 13 IS - 2 SP - 26 EP - 57 PB - American Economic Association CY - Nashville, Tenn. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas A1 - Klier, Julia A1 - Stern, Sebastian A1 - Thiel, Lea T1 - Sustaining high performance beyond public-sector pilot projects. Y1 - 2018 IS - September 2018 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bernecker, Andreas A1 - Boyer, Pierre A1 - Gathmann, Christina T1 - The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform T2 - CESifo Working Paper Y1 - 2018 SN - ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version) IS - No. 6964 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies JF - Journal of Public Economics N2 - Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house. Y1 - 2016 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 SN - 0047-2727 VL - 142 SP - 24 EP - 38 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition. Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001 SN - 0176-2680 VL - 36 SP - 55 EP - 70 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms JF - CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison Y1 - 2014 SN - 1612-0663 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 47 EP - 52 PB - Ifo Institute for Economic Research CY - München ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Bernecker, Andreas T1 - Essays in Empirical Political Economics Y1 - 2014 N1 - Mannheim, Univ., Diss., 2014. ER -