TY  - JOUR
A1  - Görgens, Stefan
A1  - Greubel, Steffen
A1  - Moosdorf, Andreas
T1  - How to mobilize 20,000 people: Perspectives on retail and consumer goods
Y1  - 2013
SP  - 52
EP  - 58
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Moosdorf, Andreas
T1  - It’s not just the Talent, it’s the Knowledge Transfer Method
JF  - GC Ticker
Y1  - 2009
IS  - 1
SP  - 16
EP  - 16
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Moosdorf, Andreas
T1  - The determinants of international knowledge transfer effectiveness - conceptual advances and empirical verification
Y1  - 2008
N1  - The University of Leeds > Leeds University Business School. Thesis (PhD)
ER  - 
TY  - CHAP
A1  - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin
T1  - Names of individuals
T2  - European Encyclopedia of Private International Law
Y1  - 2017
SN  - 9781782547228
PB  - Edward Elgar Publishing
CY  - Cheltenham, UK
ER  - 
TY  - CHAP
A1  - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin
T1  - Small Claims Regulation
T2  - European Encyclopedia of Private International Law
Y1  - 2017
SN  - 9781782547228
PB  - Edward Elgar Publishing
CY  - Cheltenham, UK
ER  - 
TY  - CHAP
A1  - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin
ED  - Calliess, Gralf-Peter
T1  - Art. 5 Rom III-Regulation (choice of applicable law by the parties)
T2  - Rome Regulations : commentary
Y1  - 2015
SN  - 9789041147547
PB  - Wolters Kluwer
ET  - 2nd ed.
ER  - 
TY  - CHAP
A1  - Kroll-Ludwigs, Kathrin
ED  - Colliess, Gralf-Peter
T1  - Art. 7 Rome III-Regulation (formal validity)
T2  - Rome Regulations :  commentary
Y1  - 2015
SN  - 9789041147547
PB  - Wolters Kluwer
ET  - 2nd ed.
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bernecker, Andreas
T1  - Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies
JF  - Journal of Public Economics
N2  - Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003
SN  - 0047-2727
VL  - 142
SP  - 24
EP  - 38
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Amsterdam
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bernecker, Andreas
T1  - Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament
JF  - European Journal of Political Economy
N2  - Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.
Y1  - 2014
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.001
SN  - 0176-2680
VL  - 36
SP  - 55
EP  - 70
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Amsterdam
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bernecker, Andreas
T1  - Divided Government and the Adoption of Economic Reforms
JF  - CESifo DICE Report - Journal for Institutional Comparison
Y1  - 2014
SN  - 1612-0663
VL  - 12
IS  - 4
SP  - 47
EP  - 52
PB  - Ifo Institute for Economic Research
CY  - München
ER  -