Open Access

For typical cases of non-isolated lightning protection systems (LPS) the impulse currents are investigated which may flow through a human body directly touching a structural part of the LPS. Based on a basic LPS model with conventional down-conductors especially the cases of external and internal steel columns and metal façades are considered and compared. Numerical simulations of the line quantities voltages and currents in the time domain are performed with an equivalent circuit of the entire LPS. As a result it can be stated that by increasing the number of conventional down-conductors and external steel columns the threat for a human being can indeed be reduced, but not down to an acceptable limit. In case of internal steel columns used as natural down-conductors the threat can be reduced sufficiently, depending on the low-resistive connection of the steel columns to the lightning equipotential bonding or the earth termination system, resp. If a metal façade is used the threat for human beings touching is usually very low, if the façade is sufficiently interconnected and multiply connected to the lightning equipotential bonding or the earth termination system, resp.

Für das Auftreten extremer Wetterereignisse werden für Kernkraftwerke Eintrittshäufigkeiten für nicht mehr beherrschbare Zustände von unter 10⁻⁴/a gefordert. Dies gilt auch für die Einwirkung von Blitzeinschlägen. Die bisherige Nachweisführung zu Blitz- und Überspannungsschutz eines KKW in Deutschland ist deterministisch. In diesem Bericht werden das Vorgehen für einen entsprechenden Nachweis für leittechnische Einrichtungen der Sicherheitstechnik von KKW, der zur geforderten Zielgröße der Eintrittshäufigkeit führt. Die Ergebnisse werden zusammenfassend bewertet.

The 2nd edition of the lightning risk management standard (IEC 62305-2) considers structures, which may endanger environment. In these cases, the loss is not limited to the structure itself, which is valid for usual structures. In the past (Edition 1) this danger was simply taken into account by a special hazard factor, multiplying the existing risk for the structure with a number. Now, in the edition 2, we add to the risk for the structure itself a “second risk” due to the losses outside the structure. The losses outside can be treated independently from what occurs inside. This is a major advantage to analyze the risk for sensitive structures, like chemical plants, nuclear plants, or structures containing explosives, etc. In this paper, the existing procedure given by the European version EN 62305-2 Ed.2 is further developed and applied to a few structures.