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Market data for the German telecom market shows that Deutsche Telekom as the former incumbent is constantly loosing shares on all arkets for voice telephony: the market for local calls, the market for long-distance calls and the market for international calls. At the same time prices decline steadily with the latest trend being that operators offer voice services free of charge, the costs of which are covered by a monthly subscription charge. Against this background the paper examines the state of policy and regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector in Germany almost 10 years after the liberalisation of the fixed telecommunications market. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of the competitive conditions that have been established on the German market for voice telephony services. If these retail markets are competitive, there might be a need to remove remaining regulatory provisions. In the new environment of converging markets the future challenge of regulating fixed telecom markets might be to ensure that access to the network and/or services of a potentially dominant provider in a relevant market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination.
CO2-Emissionshandel
(2006)
A key feature of future broadband markets will be diversity of access technologies, meaning that numerous technologies will be exploited for broadband communication. Various factors will affect the success of these future broadband markets, the regulatory policy being one amongst others. So far, a coherent regulatory approach does not exist as to broadband markets. First results of policies so far suggest that less sector-specific regulation is likely to occur. Instead, regulators must ensure that access to networks and services of potentially dominant providers in a relevant broadband market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination. In this environment the future challenge of regulationg broadband markets will be to set the right incentives for investment into new infrastructures. This paper examines whether there is a need for the regulation of future broadband access markets an if yes, what is the appropriate regulatory tool to do so. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of European broadband markets and the regulatory approaches applied. The first section provides a description of the characteristics of future broadband markets. The second section discusses possible bottlenecks on broadband markets an their regulatory implications. The third section will examine regulatory issues concerning access to broadband networks in more detail. This will be done by comparing the regulatory approaches of European countries and the results in terms of bradband penetration. The final section will give key recommendations for a regulatory strategy on brandband access markets.
- Wie kam es zu der globalen Finanzkrise? - Wodurch zeichnet sich die Finanzkrise aus? - Wer hat die Finanzkrise verschuldet? - Welche Rolle spielten Spekulanten? - Inwiefern ist die Finanzkrise selbstverschuldet? - Ist die Globalisierung Schuld an den Finanzkrisen in zahlreichen Regionen dieser Welt? - Wie wirkt sich die Finanzkrise auf die Realwirtschaft aus? - Welche Wege bieten sich, aus der Krise herauszukommen?
Working paper distributed at 2nd Annual Next Generation Telecommunications Conference 2009, 13th – 14th October 2009, Brussels 14 pages Abstract Governments all over Europe are in the process of adopting new broadband strategies. The objective is to create modern telecommunications networks based on powerful broadband infrastructures". In doing so, they aim for innovative and investment-friendly concepts. For instance, in a recently published consultation paper on the subject the German regulator BNetzA declared that it will take “greater account of … reducing risks, securing the investment and innovation power, providing planning certainty and transparency – in order to support and advance broadband rollout in Germany”. It further states that when regulating wholesale rates it has to be ensured that “… adequate incentives for network rollout are provided on the one hand, while sustainable and fair competition is ensured on the other”. Also an EC draft recommendation on regulated network access is about to set new standards for the regulation of next generation access networks. According to the recommendation the prices of new assets shall be based on costs plus a projectspecific risk premium to be included in the costs of capital for the investment risk incurred by the operator. This approach has been criticised from various sides. In particular it has been questioned whether such an approach is adequate to meet the objectives of encouraging both competition and investment into next generation access networks. Against this background, the concept of “long term risk sharing contracts” has been proposed recently as an approach which does not only incorporate the various additional risks involved in the deployment of NGA infrastructure, but has several other advantages. This paper will demonstrate that the concept allows for competition to evolve at both the retail and wholesale level on fair, objective, non-discriminatory and transparent terms and conditions. Moreover, it ensures the highest possible investment incentive in line with socially desirable outcome. The paper is organised as follows: The next section will briefly outline the importance of encouraging competition and investment in an NGA-environment. The third section will specify the design of long term risk sharing contracts in view of achieving these objectives. The fourth section will examine potential problems associated with the concept. In doing so a way of how to deal with them will be elaborated. The last section will look at arguments against long term risk sharing contracts. It will be shown that these arguments are not strong enough to build a case against introducing such contracts.