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Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.