Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies
- Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.
Author: | Andreas Bernecker |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
Parent Title (English): | Journal of Public Economics |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Place of publication: | Amsterdam |
Document Type: | Article |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2016 |
Volume: | 142 |
First Page: | 24 |
Last Page: | 38 |
Link: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 |
Zugriffsart: | campus |
Institutes: | FH Aachen / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
collections: | Verlag / Elsevier |