Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies
- Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.
Verfasserangaben: | Andreas Bernecker |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch): | Journal of Public Economics |
Verlag: | Elsevier |
Verlagsort: | Amsterdam |
Dokumentart: | Wissenschaftlicher Artikel |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2016 |
Datum der Publikation (Server): | 07.02.2019 |
Jahrgang: | 142 |
Erste Seite: | 24 |
Letzte Seite: | 38 |
Link: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.003 |
Zugriffsart: | campus |
Fachbereiche und Einrichtungen: | FH Aachen / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
collections: | Verlag / Elsevier |