Privacy-preserving multi-party reconciliation secure in the malicious model

The problem of fair and privacy-preserving ordered set reconciliation arises in a variety of applications like auctions, e-voting, and appointment reconciliation. While several multi-party protocols have been proposed that solve this problem in the semi-honest model, there are no multi-party protocols that are secure in the malicious model so far. In this paper, we close this gap. Our newly proposed protocols are shown to be secure in the malicious model based on a variety of novel non-interactive zero-knowledge-proofs. We describe the implementation of our protocols and evaluate their performance in comparison to protocols solving the problem in the semi-honest case.

Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:	Georg Neugebauer, Lucas Brutschy, Ulrike Meyer, Susanne Wetzel
DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54568-9_12
ISBN:	978-3-642-54567-2 (Print)
ISBN:	978-3-642-54568-9 (Online)
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch):	DPM 2013, SETOP 2013: Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security
Verlag:	Springer
Verlagsort:	Berlin
Herausgeber:	Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro, Georgios Lioudakis, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia, Simon Foley, William M. Fitzgerald
Dokumentart:	Konferenzveröffentlichung
Sprache:	Englisch
Erscheinungsjahr:	2014
Datum der Publikation (Server):	11.09.2023
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:	Cryptographic protocols; Malicious model; Privacy-enhancing technologies; Secure multi-party computation; Zero-knowledge proofs
Erste Seite:	178
Letzte Seite:	193
Bemerkung:	8th International Workshop, DPM 2013, and 6th International Workshop, SETOP 2013, Egham, UK, September 12-13, 2013. Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 8247)
Link:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54568-9_12
Zugriffsart:	campus
Fachbereiche und Einrichtungen:	FH Aachen / Fachbereich Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik
collections:	Verlag / Springer

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