Refine
Year of publication
Institute
- Fachbereich Medizintechnik und Technomathematik (124)
- IfB - Institut für Bioengineering (60)
- Fachbereich Energietechnik (27)
- INB - Institut für Nano- und Biotechnologien (24)
- Fachbereich Maschinenbau und Mechatronik (17)
- Fachbereich Luft- und Raumfahrttechnik (16)
- Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften (15)
- Fachbereich Chemie und Biotechnologie (14)
- Fachbereich Bauingenieurwesen (7)
- Fachbereich Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik (7)
Has Fulltext
- yes (226) (remove)
Language
- English (226) (remove)
Document Type
- Conference Proceeding (132)
- Article (83)
- Lecture (5)
- Working Paper (4)
- Conference Poster (1)
- Talk (1)
Keywords
- Biosensor (25)
- Finite-Elemente-Methode (12)
- Einspielen <Werkstoff> (10)
- CAD (8)
- civil engineering (8)
- Bauingenieurwesen (7)
- Blitzschutz (6)
- FEM (6)
- Clusterion (5)
- shakedown analysis (5)
On 1st January 1998, the German telecom market was fully liberalised. Since then genuine competition between market participants has developed, based on a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that provides for safeguards against unfair competition and market power by Deutsche Telekom. Today, about 10 years after the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector a revision of this regulatory approach has become necessary because at least on three dimensions the situation is quite different from the one 10 years ago: First, with numerous established alternative operators in the market monopolies have been successfully challenged and competition introduced. Second, not only is Cable TV becoming in large parts of Germany a viable alternative for the provision of broadband services but also mobile services are becoming increasingly a substitute for fixed services. Last but not least there are important technological changes under way, requiring huge investments in infrastructure upgrades for next generation networks. In the light of these new developments the question is to which extent the current regulatory approach of severe ex-ante regulatory intervention is still appropriate. Is any part of the network of the former incumbent still a bottleneck? A more light handed regulatory approach might be the right response to this new situation. The paper is organised as follows: The first section will briefly examine the economic rationale for regulating network access. Based on the assumption that regulation is always necessary when bottlenecks exist regulatory principles for an efficient network access regime will be derived. The second section compares the situation of the German market in early 1998 with the one of today. Thereby three dimensions will be considered: the degree of competition, the potential for substitution and technological developments. The third section will define some requirements for the future regulation of telecom markets. Proposals will be elaborated how to ensure competitive telecom markets in the light of new economic and technological challenges.
A key feature of future broadband markets will be diversity of access technologies, meaning that numerous technologies will be exploited for broadband communication. Various factors will affect the success of these future broadband markets, the regulatory policy being one amongst others. So far, a coherent regulatory approach does not exist as to broadband markets. First results of policies so far suggest that less sector-specific regulation is likely to occur. Instead, regulators must ensure that access to networks and services of potentially dominant providers in a relevant broadband market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination. In this environment the future challenge of regulationg broadband markets will be to set the right incentives for investment into new infrastructures. This paper examines whether there is a need for the regulation of future broadband access markets an if yes, what is the appropriate regulatory tool to do so. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of European broadband markets and the regulatory approaches applied. The first section provides a description of the characteristics of future broadband markets. The second section discusses possible bottlenecks on broadband markets an their regulatory implications. The third section will examine regulatory issues concerning access to broadband networks in more detail. This will be done by comparing the regulatory approaches of European countries and the results in terms of bradband penetration. The final section will give key recommendations for a regulatory strategy on brandband access markets.
Market data for the German telecom market shows that Deutsche Telekom as the former incumbent is constantly loosing shares on all arkets for voice telephony: the market for local calls, the market for long-distance calls and the market for international calls. At the same time prices decline steadily with the latest trend being that operators offer voice services free of charge, the costs of which are covered by a monthly subscription charge. Against this background the paper examines the state of policy and regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector in Germany almost 10 years after the liberalisation of the fixed telecommunications market. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of the competitive conditions that have been established on the German market for voice telephony services. If these retail markets are competitive, there might be a need to remove remaining regulatory provisions. In the new environment of converging markets the future challenge of regulating fixed telecom markets might be to ensure that access to the network and/or services of a potentially dominant provider in a relevant market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination.
Working paper distributed at 2nd Annual Next Generation Telecommunications Conference 2009, 13th – 14th October 2009, Brussels 14 pages Abstract Governments all over Europe are in the process of adopting new broadband strategies. The objective is to create modern telecommunications networks based on powerful broadband infrastructures". In doing so, they aim for innovative and investment-friendly concepts. For instance, in a recently published consultation paper on the subject the German regulator BNetzA declared that it will take “greater account of … reducing risks, securing the investment and innovation power, providing planning certainty and transparency – in order to support and advance broadband rollout in Germany”. It further states that when regulating wholesale rates it has to be ensured that “… adequate incentives for network rollout are provided on the one hand, while sustainable and fair competition is ensured on the other”. Also an EC draft recommendation on regulated network access is about to set new standards for the regulation of next generation access networks. According to the recommendation the prices of new assets shall be based on costs plus a projectspecific risk premium to be included in the costs of capital for the investment risk incurred by the operator. This approach has been criticised from various sides. In particular it has been questioned whether such an approach is adequate to meet the objectives of encouraging both competition and investment into next generation access networks. Against this background, the concept of “long term risk sharing contracts” has been proposed recently as an approach which does not only incorporate the various additional risks involved in the deployment of NGA infrastructure, but has several other advantages. This paper will demonstrate that the concept allows for competition to evolve at both the retail and wholesale level on fair, objective, non-discriminatory and transparent terms and conditions. Moreover, it ensures the highest possible investment incentive in line with socially desirable outcome. The paper is organised as follows: The next section will briefly outline the importance of encouraging competition and investment in an NGA-environment. The third section will specify the design of long term risk sharing contracts in view of achieving these objectives. The fourth section will examine potential problems associated with the concept. In doing so a way of how to deal with them will be elaborated. The last section will look at arguments against long term risk sharing contracts. It will be shown that these arguments are not strong enough to build a case against introducing such contracts.
To give the exchange of goods and services between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) new momentum the two parties are currently negotiating the transatlantic free trade agreement Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The aim is to create the largest free trade area in the world. The agreement, once entered into force, will oblige EU countries and the U.S. to further liberalize their markets.
The negotiations on TTIP include a chapter on Electronic Communications/ Telecommunications. The challenge therein will be securing commitments for market access to Electronic Communications services. At the same time, these commitments must reflect the legitimate need for consumer protection issues. The need to reduce Electronic Communications-related non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties is due to the fact that these markets are heavily regulated. Without transnational rules as to regulations national governments can abuse these regulations to deter the market entry by new (foreign) suppliers. Thus the free trade agreement TTIP affects in many respects regulatory provisions on and access to Electronic Communications markets. The objective of this paper is therefore to examine to what extend the regulatory principles for Electronic Communications markets envisaged under TTIP will result in trade facilitation and regulatory convergence between the EU and the U.S.
As to this question the result of the analysis is that the chapter on Electronic Communications will be an important step towards facilitating trade in Electronic Communications services. At the same time some regulatory convergence will take place, but this convergence will not lead to a (full) harmonization of regulations. Rather the norm, also after TTIP negotiations will have been concluded successfully, will be mutual recognition of different regulatory regimes. Different regulations being the optimal policy response in different market settings will continue to exist. Moreover, it is very unlikely that such regulatory principles for the Electronic Communications sector are a vehicle for a race to the bottom in levels of consumer protection.
For short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft, a parallel hybrid-electric propulsion system potentially offers superior performance compared to a conventional propulsion system, because the short-take-off power requirement is much higher than the cruise power requirement. This power-matching problem can be solved with a balanced hybrid propulsion system. However, there is a trade-off between wing loading, power loading, the level of hybridization, as well as range and take-off distance. An optimization method can vary design variables in such a way that a minimum of a particular objective is attained. In this paper, a comparison between the optimization results for minimum mass, minimum consumed primary energy, and minimum cost is conducted. A new initial sizing algorithm for general aviation aircraft with hybrid-electric propulsion systems is applied. This initial sizing methodology covers point performance, mission performance analysis, the weight estimation process, and cost estimation. The methodology is applied to the design of a STOL general aviation aircraft, intended for on-demand air mobility operations. The aircraft is sized to carry eight passengers over a distance of 500 km, while able to take off and land from short airstrips. Results indicate that parallel hybrid-electric propulsion systems must be considered for future STOL aircraft.
The main objective of our ROS Summer School series is to introduce MA level students to program mobile robots with the Robot Operating System (ROS). ROS is a robot middleware that is used my many research institutions world-wide. Therefore, many state-of-the-art algorithms of mobile robotics are available in ROS and can be deployed very easily. As a basic robot platform we deploy a 1/10 RC cart that is wquipped with an Arduino micro-controller to control the servo motors, and an embedded PC that runs ROS. In two weeks, participants get to learn the basics of mobile robotics hands-on. We describe our teaching concepts and our curriculum and report on the learning success of our students.
The aim of the present study was the characterisation of three true subtilisins and one phylogenetically intermediate subtilisin from halotolerant and halophilic microorganisms. Considering the currently growing enzyme market for efficient and novel biocatalysts, data mining is a promising source for novel, as yet uncharacterised enzymes, especially from halophilic or halotolerant Bacillaceae, which offer great potential to meet industrial needs. Both halophilic bacteria Pontibacillus marinus DSM 16465ᵀ and Alkalibacillus haloalkaliphilus DSM 5271ᵀ and both halotolerant bacteria Metabacillus indicus DSM 16189 and Litchfieldia alkalitelluris DSM 16976ᵀ served as a source for the four new subtilisins SPPM, SPAH, SPMI and SPLA. The protease genes were cloned and expressed in Bacillus subtilis DB104. Purification to apparent homogeneity was achieved by ethanol precipitation, desalting and ion-exchange chromatography. Enzyme activity could be observed between pH 5.0–12.0 with an optimum for SPPM, SPMI and SPLA around pH 9.0 and for SPAH at pH 10.0. The optimal temperature for SPMI and SPLA was 70 °C and for SPPM and SPAH 55 °C and 50 °C, respectively. All proteases showed high stability towards 5% (w/v) SDS and were active even at NaCl concentrations of 5 M. The four proteases demonstrate potential for future biotechnological applications.