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Next Generation Access Networks: Why is there a higher risk of investment and how to deal with it?
(2009)
Veränderte Anforderungen an eine europäische Standardisierungspolitik in der Telekommunikation
(1996)
The case for a more binding WTO agreement on regulatory principles in telecommunication markets
(1999)
Veränderte Anforderungen an eine europäische Standardisierungspolitik in der Telekommunikation
(1997)
On 1st January 1998, the German telecom market was fully liberalised. Since then genuine competition between market participants has developed, based on a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that provides for safeguards against unfair competition and market power by Deutsche Telekom. Today, about 10 years after the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector a revision of this regulatory approach has become necessary because at least on three dimensions the situation is quite different from the one 10 years ago: First, with numerous established alternative operators in the market monopolies have been successfully challenged and competition introduced. Second, not only is Cable TV becoming in large parts of Germany a viable alternative for the provision of broadband services but also mobile services are becoming increasingly a substitute for fixed services. Last but not least there are important technological changes under way, requiring huge investments in infrastructure upgrades for next generation networks. In the light of these new developments the question is to which extent the current regulatory approach of severe ex-ante regulatory intervention is still appropriate. Is any part of the network of the former incumbent still a bottleneck? A more light handed regulatory approach might be the right response to this new situation. The paper is organised as follows: The first section will briefly examine the economic rationale for regulating network access. Based on the assumption that regulation is always necessary when bottlenecks exist regulatory principles for an efficient network access regime will be derived. The second section compares the situation of the German market in early 1998 with the one of today. Thereby three dimensions will be considered: the degree of competition, the potential for substitution and technological developments. The third section will define some requirements for the future regulation of telecom markets. Proposals will be elaborated how to ensure competitive telecom markets in the light of new economic and technological challenges.
- Wie kam es zu der globalen Finanzkrise? - Wodurch zeichnet sich die Finanzkrise aus? - Wer hat die Finanzkrise verschuldet? - Welche Rolle spielten Spekulanten? - Inwiefern ist die Finanzkrise selbstverschuldet? - Ist die Globalisierung Schuld an den Finanzkrisen in zahlreichen Regionen dieser Welt? - Wie wirkt sich die Finanzkrise auf die Realwirtschaft aus? - Welche Wege bieten sich, aus der Krise herauszukommen?
A key feature of future broadband markets will be diversity of access technologies, meaning that numerous technologies will be exploited for broadband communication. Various factors will affect the success of these future broadband markets, the regulatory policy being one amongst others. So far, a coherent regulatory approach does not exist as to broadband markets. First results of policies so far suggest that less sector-specific regulation is likely to occur. Instead, regulators must ensure that access to networks and services of potentially dominant providers in a relevant broadband market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination. In this environment the future challenge of regulationg broadband markets will be to set the right incentives for investment into new infrastructures. This paper examines whether there is a need for the regulation of future broadband access markets an if yes, what is the appropriate regulatory tool to do so. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of European broadband markets and the regulatory approaches applied. The first section provides a description of the characteristics of future broadband markets. The second section discusses possible bottlenecks on broadband markets an their regulatory implications. The third section will examine regulatory issues concerning access to broadband networks in more detail. This will be done by comparing the regulatory approaches of European countries and the results in terms of bradband penetration. The final section will give key recommendations for a regulatory strategy on brandband access markets.
Market data for the German telecom market shows that Deutsche Telekom as the former incumbent is constantly loosing shares on all arkets for voice telephony: the market for local calls, the market for long-distance calls and the market for international calls. At the same time prices decline steadily with the latest trend being that operators offer voice services free of charge, the costs of which are covered by a monthly subscription charge. Against this background the paper examines the state of policy and regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector in Germany almost 10 years after the liberalisation of the fixed telecommunications market. Thereby the focus is on the analysis of the competitive conditions that have been established on the German market for voice telephony services. If these retail markets are competitive, there might be a need to remove remaining regulatory provisions. In the new environment of converging markets the future challenge of regulating fixed telecom markets might be to ensure that access to the network and/or services of a potentially dominant provider in a relevant market will satisfy requirements for openness and non-discrimination.
Working paper distributed at 2nd Annual Next Generation Telecommunications Conference 2009, 13th – 14th October 2009, Brussels 14 pages Abstract Governments all over Europe are in the process of adopting new broadband strategies. The objective is to create modern telecommunications networks based on powerful broadband infrastructures". In doing so, they aim for innovative and investment-friendly concepts. For instance, in a recently published consultation paper on the subject the German regulator BNetzA declared that it will take “greater account of … reducing risks, securing the investment and innovation power, providing planning certainty and transparency – in order to support and advance broadband rollout in Germany”. It further states that when regulating wholesale rates it has to be ensured that “… adequate incentives for network rollout are provided on the one hand, while sustainable and fair competition is ensured on the other”. Also an EC draft recommendation on regulated network access is about to set new standards for the regulation of next generation access networks. According to the recommendation the prices of new assets shall be based on costs plus a projectspecific risk premium to be included in the costs of capital for the investment risk incurred by the operator. This approach has been criticised from various sides. In particular it has been questioned whether such an approach is adequate to meet the objectives of encouraging both competition and investment into next generation access networks. Against this background, the concept of “long term risk sharing contracts” has been proposed recently as an approach which does not only incorporate the various additional risks involved in the deployment of NGA infrastructure, but has several other advantages. This paper will demonstrate that the concept allows for competition to evolve at both the retail and wholesale level on fair, objective, non-discriminatory and transparent terms and conditions. Moreover, it ensures the highest possible investment incentive in line with socially desirable outcome. The paper is organised as follows: The next section will briefly outline the importance of encouraging competition and investment in an NGA-environment. The third section will specify the design of long term risk sharing contracts in view of achieving these objectives. The fourth section will examine potential problems associated with the concept. In doing so a way of how to deal with them will be elaborated. The last section will look at arguments against long term risk sharing contracts. It will be shown that these arguments are not strong enough to build a case against introducing such contracts.
CO2-Emissionshandel
(2006)
Im Jahr 2015 wurden in Deutschland über drei Millionen Benzinautos und lediglich 12.363 Elektroautos neu zugelassen. Das ursprünglich von der Bundesregierung vorgegebene Ziel, dass bis 2020 eine Million E-Autos auf deutschen Straßen fahren (und bis 2030 sechs Millionen), rückt damit in immer weitere Ferne. Um das Ziel dennoch zu erreichen, plant die Bundesregierung nun eine staatliche Prämie für den Kauf von Elektroautos: Umwelt-, Verkehrs- und Wirtschaftsministerium haben gemeinsam ein Konzept entworfen, dem zufolge private Käufer zukünftig einen Zuschuss von 5.000 Euro beim Erwerb eines Elektroautos bekommen sollen. 40 Prozent dieses Zuschusses soll von den Autoherstellern getragen werden. Das Programm, das weitere ausgabenwirksame öffentliche Maßnahmen vorsieht, würde Kosten in Milliardenhöhe verursachen. Die beabsichtigte Subventionierung wirft die Frage auf, ob diese wirtschaftlich sinnvoll sind.
To give the exchange of goods and services between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) new momentum the two parties are currently negotiating the transatlantic free trade agreement Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The aim is to create the largest free trade area in the world. The agreement, once entered into force, will oblige EU countries and the U.S. to further liberalize their markets.
The negotiations on TTIP include a chapter on Electronic Communications/ Telecommunications. The challenge therein will be securing commitments for market access to Electronic Communications services. At the same time, these commitments must reflect the legitimate need for consumer protection issues. The need to reduce Electronic Communications-related non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties is due to the fact that these markets are heavily regulated. Without transnational rules as to regulations national governments can abuse these regulations to deter the market entry by new (foreign) suppliers. Thus the free trade agreement TTIP affects in many respects regulatory provisions on and access to Electronic Communications markets. The objective of this paper is therefore to examine to what extend the regulatory principles for Electronic Communications markets envisaged under TTIP will result in trade facilitation and regulatory convergence between the EU and the U.S.
As to this question the result of the analysis is that the chapter on Electronic Communications will be an important step towards facilitating trade in Electronic Communications services. At the same time some regulatory convergence will take place, but this convergence will not lead to a (full) harmonization of regulations. Rather the norm, also after TTIP negotiations will have been concluded successfully, will be mutual recognition of different regulatory regimes. Different regulations being the optimal policy response in different market settings will continue to exist. Moreover, it is very unlikely that such regulatory principles for the Electronic Communications sector are a vehicle for a race to the bottom in levels of consumer protection.
In den letzten Jahren haben in Deutschland mehrere Bundesländer Studiengebühren eingeführt. Seitdem wird in der Politik heftig über das Für und Wider diskutiert. Von den Gegnern wird häufig das Argument vorgebracht, Studiengebühren seien sozial ungerecht und würden insbesondere einkommensschwache Bevölkerungsschichten von einem Studium abhalten. Bestätigt werden sie von den Zahlen aus Umfragen, denen zufolge über 70 Prozent derjenigen, die sich gegen ein Studium entscheiden, finanzielle Gründe für einen Studienverzicht anführen. Befürworter halten dem entgegen, Studiengebühren seien angesichts knapper öffentlicher Kassen unbedingt notwendig, da nur so die Qualität der Lehre aufrechterhalten bzw. verbessert werden könne. Zudem würden Studiengebühren die sozialen Bildungsbarrieren keineswegs erhöhen, was auch daran erkennbar sei, dass infolge der Studiengebühren die Zahl der Studierenden nicht zurückgegangen ist. Der vorliegende Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte, indem er die an einer Hochschule in Nordrhein-Westfalen gesammelten Erfahrungen mit Studiengebühren auswertet
This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.
Glasfaserbasierte Breitbandnetze werden in Deutschland auch aufgrund der Wirtschaftskrise nur sehr zögerlich ausgebaut. Markus Fredebeul-Krein hält eine staatliche Subventionierung der Breitbandnetze nur bedingt für gerechtfertigt. Private Investoren benötigen jedoch dringend Planungssicherheit durch verlässliche Regulierungsvorschriften.