Refine
Year of publication
Institute
- Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1158) (remove)
Language
- German (934)
- English (217)
- Portuguese (6)
- Spanish (1)
Document Type
- Article (705)
- Book (221)
- Part of a Book (72)
- Conference Proceeding (69)
- Other (48)
- Review (13)
- Working Paper (9)
- Contribution to a Periodical (5)
- Doctoral Thesis (5)
- Lecture (5)
Keywords
- Führung (8)
- Leadership (8)
- Telekommunikationsmarkt (6)
- Datenschutz (5)
- Motivation (5)
- Betriebswirtschaftslehre (4)
- Finanzierung (4)
- Liquiditätspolitik (4)
- Datenschutzgrundverordnung (3)
- Self-Leadership (3)
Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting sessions. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed opposition party MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem not to react significantly to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. The study also shows how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.
Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that, under divided government, a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. Several robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. Case study evidence suggests an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house.
Vorbemerkung vor § 1353
(2017)