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Inhaltsverzeichnis:
I. Lern- und Arbeitstechniken im 1. und im 10. Semester
II. Lern- und Arbeitstechniken als persönliches Selbstmanagement
III. Diskussionsfragen und -thesen
IV. Was heißt: Eigenverantwortung im Studium?
V. Eigenverantwortung als gelebte Freiheit von Studierenden
VI. Warum es unmöglich ist, Verantwortung an Studierende zu delegieren VII. Erziehungsauftrag: Studierende in ihrer Eigenverantwortung belassen VIII. Folgerungen für Lehrende IX. Folgerungen für Studierende
Many companies still conduct the worldwide management of people as if neither the external economic nor the internal structure of the firm had changed. The costs of cross-cultural failure, for individuals and their companies, are enormous: personal and family costs; financial, professional and emotional costs; costs to one’s career prospects, to one’s self-esteem, to one’s marriage and family. This scenario describes sufficiently the reason for learning “the art of crossing cultures” (Craig Storti). To this end, this research paper describes an innovative approach of cross-cultural training, following the didactical ideas of Kolb and Fry, the so-called 'experiential learning'.
Working paper distributed at 2nd Annual Next Generation Telecommunications Conference 2009, 13th – 14th October 2009, Brussels 14 pages Abstract Governments all over Europe are in the process of adopting new broadband strategies. The objective is to create modern telecommunications networks based on powerful broadband infrastructures". In doing so, they aim for innovative and investment-friendly concepts. For instance, in a recently published consultation paper on the subject the German regulator BNetzA declared that it will take “greater account of … reducing risks, securing the investment and innovation power, providing planning certainty and transparency – in order to support and advance broadband rollout in Germany”. It further states that when regulating wholesale rates it has to be ensured that “… adequate incentives for network rollout are provided on the one hand, while sustainable and fair competition is ensured on the other”. Also an EC draft recommendation on regulated network access is about to set new standards for the regulation of next generation access networks. According to the recommendation the prices of new assets shall be based on costs plus a projectspecific risk premium to be included in the costs of capital for the investment risk incurred by the operator. This approach has been criticised from various sides. In particular it has been questioned whether such an approach is adequate to meet the objectives of encouraging both competition and investment into next generation access networks. Against this background, the concept of “long term risk sharing contracts” has been proposed recently as an approach which does not only incorporate the various additional risks involved in the deployment of NGA infrastructure, but has several other advantages. This paper will demonstrate that the concept allows for competition to evolve at both the retail and wholesale level on fair, objective, non-discriminatory and transparent terms and conditions. Moreover, it ensures the highest possible investment incentive in line with socially desirable outcome. The paper is organised as follows: The next section will briefly outline the importance of encouraging competition and investment in an NGA-environment. The third section will specify the design of long term risk sharing contracts in view of achieving these objectives. The fourth section will examine potential problems associated with the concept. In doing so a way of how to deal with them will be elaborated. The last section will look at arguments against long term risk sharing contracts. It will be shown that these arguments are not strong enough to build a case against introducing such contracts.
- Wie kam es zu der globalen Finanzkrise? - Wodurch zeichnet sich die Finanzkrise aus? - Wer hat die Finanzkrise verschuldet? - Welche Rolle spielten Spekulanten? - Inwiefern ist die Finanzkrise selbstverschuldet? - Ist die Globalisierung Schuld an den Finanzkrisen in zahlreichen Regionen dieser Welt? - Wie wirkt sich die Finanzkrise auf die Realwirtschaft aus? - Welche Wege bieten sich, aus der Krise herauszukommen?
On 1st January 1998, the German telecom market was fully liberalised. Since then genuine competition between market participants has developed, based on a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that provides for safeguards against unfair competition and market power by Deutsche Telekom. Today, about 10 years after the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector a revision of this regulatory approach has become necessary because at least on three dimensions the situation is quite different from the one 10 years ago: First, with numerous established alternative operators in the market monopolies have been successfully challenged and competition introduced. Second, not only is Cable TV becoming in large parts of Germany a viable alternative for the provision of broadband services but also mobile services are becoming increasingly a substitute for fixed services. Last but not least there are important technological changes under way, requiring huge investments in infrastructure upgrades for next generation networks. In the light of these new developments the question is to which extent the current regulatory approach of severe ex-ante regulatory intervention is still appropriate. Is any part of the network of the former incumbent still a bottleneck? A more light handed regulatory approach might be the right response to this new situation. The paper is organised as follows: The first section will briefly examine the economic rationale for regulating network access. Based on the assumption that regulation is always necessary when bottlenecks exist regulatory principles for an efficient network access regime will be derived. The second section compares the situation of the German market in early 1998 with the one of today. Thereby three dimensions will be considered: the degree of competition, the potential for substitution and technological developments. The third section will define some requirements for the future regulation of telecom markets. Proposals will be elaborated how to ensure competitive telecom markets in the light of new economic and technological challenges.